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PROBLEM OF PROCEDURAL DELAY
The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings
Under the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act
I.

INTRODUCTION

In its zeal to insure basic fairness to citizens dealing with state
administrative entities, the 1973 North Carolina General Assembly enacted a comprehensive and precise statement of public rights and governmental duties destined to become the core of North Carolina administrative law. The North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act
(hereinafter cited as "APA") covers all aspects of administrative rulemaking, contested case adjudication, judicial review, and the publication
of agency rules for state government departments having no prior
statutory guidance. The thrust of the new law is to establish by statute
rights to the principal characteristics of due process in administrative
hearings-notice, and a fair hearing.
In accomplishing this goal, the authors of the APA have provided
private parties with numerous avenues of appeal, both administrative
and judicial. In practical effect, this policy could enable private parties
(particularly those involved in regulatory and licensing matters) to stall
administrative functions for long periods of time. The present case
backlogs in the court systems, both state and federal, strongly suggest a
similar fate for administrative agencies unless the possibilities for deliberate delay are minimized insofar as the demands of due process permit.
The problem of delay in contested case hearings brought under the
new APA is threefold. First, delay may permit dangerous, shoddy, or
otherwise unfit merchandise or inadequate services to be foisted upon
the public. Moreover, where business activities are involved, delay may
allow firms violating agency regulations a competitive advantage over
firms which choose to comply. Second, long delays in administrative
proceedings may tend to weaken the regulatory scheme by forcing
agencies to consider dropping contested case charges rather than facing
the possibility of costly drawn-out proceedings that might ultimately be
decided in the defendant party's favor. Finally, administrative delay
presents a serious problem of waste of the resources of the agency, the
time of agency personnel, and consequently, the taxpayer's money.
The APA introduces new complexities to administrative law in North
Carolina. Complexity in procedure, coupled with the difficulty of finding and interpreting agency rules, will probably mean that more and
more parties to contested case hearings will be represented by attorneys.
Furthermore, by sensing the General Assembly's concern that private
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parties be guaranteed due process in administrative actions, reviewing
courts probably will demand greater protection of defendant parties'
rights. In order to meet these advancements in the law, administrators
must learn to deal with the problems of procedural delay in a legal

context.
II.

THE TACTICS OF DELAY

Four primary areas are vulnerable to tactics of procedural delay
under the APA: postponements of hearing dates for cause or convenience;' objections to the place of the hearing (venue) ;2 petitions for the
disqualification of hearing officers for bias;3 and, the contesting of
subpoenas.4
Postponement of trial dates are a constant source of trouble for
judges, parties, and attorneys alike in the judicial system. While postponements are beneficial in some cases and necessary in others, it is
evident that the potential for using them to wear down the opposition's
resistance is enormous. This threat carries over directly from the
judicial sphere to the administrative, and although one must usually
justify requests for continuances, such postponements are often granted
on insignificant bases in order to insure the fairness of the proceeding.
There are many possibilities open to one who would delay a contested
case hearing by moving for a postponement. The APA provides for the
filing of answers by parties to a hearing. 5 Since the time allowed for
the filing of such answers is generally a "reasonable" time, 6 it would be
necessary to consider the complexity of the case, the relative positions
of the parties, and other factors in order to arrive at a date upon which
answers would be due. All of these decisions are matters of discretion
with the hearing officer and, accordingly, are subject to judicial review.
Additionally, continuances can be had for the personal convenience
of a party, his attorney, or his witnesses.7 Such postponements are
common in courts of law, although their use is usually limited to a very
few times per case. Illness of a party constitutes another acceptable
reason for delay of a contested case. Instances of using sickness as a
1. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 150A-33(4) (Supp. 1974).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-24 (Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-32(b) (Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-27 (Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-25(b) (Supp. 1974).
Id.; See also C. DAYE, North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act Manual §
18.04 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DAYE].
7. See generally, Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. N.C.
1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959). The case
holds, in part, that witnesses are indispensible parties to administrative proceedings, and
must be given every reasonable opportunity to testify.
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delaying mechanism can be diminished by requiring a supporting statement from a physician to accompany any petition for delay; however, to
proceed with a contested case hearing in the absence of a party who had
claimed sickness, even absent a physician's statement, may cast doubt
upon the basic fairness of the proceeding.
As an additional delaying tactic, a defendant party might petition for
a pre-hearing conference, or for a reinspection of conditions previously
determined to be in violation of agency rules and regulations. From the
agency's standpoint, the former situation would usually be desirable as
an alternative to a full hearing. Occasionally, however, issues may not
be solved at a pre-hearing conference, thus necessitating the rescheduling of the original hearing date. In the latter instance, denial of a
reinspection request would provide excellent grounds for judicial review
and a possible showing of vindictiveness on the part of the agency.
Finally, delay of administrative hearings could be effected by the
default of a party at the original hearing,8 followed by a petition for
reopening for cause. Although all of the foregoing possibilities for the
postponement of contested case hearings can be defeated by a ruling of
the administrator in charge of the hearing, it should be noted that any
such denial of continuance is purely discretionary, 9 and accordingly,
upon judicial review, can be attacked for administrative abuse.
Venue questions are also available when parties to contested case
hearings wish to delay. 10 The APA provides several means for objecting for cause to the place of the hearing; such objections may tend to
cause the administrator in charge to grant delays while a new location is
found. An allegation that a change in location of the hearing to
promote the ends of justice would necessitate close scrutiny of the facts
surrounding the case by the administrator in charge."
His findings
would, of course, be reviewable as a discretionary matter. Furthermore,
the convenience of witnesses should be of primary importance in ruling
on a party's application for change of venue.' 2
The APA provides that a hearing on a contested case conducted by
a single hearing officer or less than a majority of the agency designated
to hear the case must be held in the county where the opposing party has
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-25(a) (Supp. 1974).

9. Rabinstein v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 15 Pa. 160, 325 A.2d 681 (1974).
The body of North Carolina law regarding administrative matters has many gaps;

consequently, the writer has included decisions from other jurisdictions indicating
general rules and the suspected path North Carolina courts might take after February 1,
1976. All cases from other jurisdictions citing such general provisions are from states
having an Administrative Procedures Act similar to that of North Carolina.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-24 (Supp. 1974).
11. Id.
12. Id.; cf. Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. N.C. 1958).
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his residence. 13 The importance of this provision is maximized when
one realizes that many, if not most, state departments hold their adjudicated contested case hearings before boards or commissions. 14 The
implication to be drawn from this is that many agencies may be forced
either to consolidate hearing dates so that cases might be heard in multiday marathon sessions or alternatively, that they designate "miniboards" to hold hearings in the defendant party's county of residence.
Finally, it must be noted that the APA deletes waiver of objection as
to location of hearings from the legal arsenal available to administrative
agencies upon judicial review. 15 This effectively permits parties to
remain silent during administrative hearings, then charge abuse of discretion as to venue upon judicial review. Administrators should be
keenly aware of this, and other problems associated with venue, in order
to avoid embarrassing remands from courts of review and the resultant
weakening of agency policy.
The right of defendant parties to challenge the qualification of hearing officers on grounds of bias provides yet another potential for delay.' 6
A "hearing officer" under the APA may be any of the following; an
agency; one or more members of the agency; a person or group of
persons designated by statute; or one or more hearing officers designated and authorized by the agency to handle contested cases.' 7 Challenges for bias in a contested case are initiated by an affidavit stating
grounds for the charge and requesting an investigation and separate
hearing on the question. 8 Although the APA states that such affidavits
must be "timely,"' 9 it is implied that a charge of bias can be timely even
after the original hearing has begun. The hearing officer in charge of
the proceeding cannot rule on his own fitness to hear the case." ° Thus,
assuming there is no one designated by statute or regulation to proceed
with the hearing (for example, in the case of the disqualification of an
entire three-man board acting as a hearing officer), the chief executive
officer of the governmental agency would be obliged to appoint someone to investigate the charges of bias and to conduct a separate hearing
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-24 (Supp. 1974).
14. Some examples of administrative boards with adjudicative authority are the
following: Gas and Oil Board (Agriculture), Structural Pest Control Committee (Agriculture), Board of Water and Air Resources (Natural and Economic Resources),
Wildlife Commission (Natural and Economic Resources), Municipal Board of Control
(Treasurer), Local Government Commission (Treasurer), Banking Commission (Com-

merce), and Rural Electrification Authority (Commerce).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-24 (Supp. 1974).
16.
17.
18.
19.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-32(b) (Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-32(a) (Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN.STAT. § 150A-32(b) (Supp. 1974).
Id.

20.

DA'E,

supra note 6, § 13.02; but see Yamada v. Natural Disaster Claims

Comm., 54 Hawaii 621, 513 P.2d 1001 (1973).
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on the matter. 21 As an alternative to an investigation and hearing on
bias charges, the agency might dismiss the administrative proceeding
without prejudice to the party, thereby leaving open the door to future
adjudication. This action, however, results in increased delay and cost
to the agency, while at the same time it defeats the purpose of the
original hearing-the protection of agency clientele.
While the problem of disqualification for bias is one of the areas most
open to delaying tactics by parties to contested cases, it is also one of the
most difficult to resolve from the perspective of the administrator. One
may assume that North Carolina courts will zealously guard against
administrative bias-both real and imagined-in their protection of the
citizen. Failure to treat the disqualification question adequately in
administrative proceedings could result in reversal or remand upon
judicial review, even if a party's allegations are substantially unproven.2 2
Finally, administrators may expect delaying tactics in contested cases
through the issuance of challenges to administratively issued subpoenas.23 The APA approves of two kinds of subpoenas-the general
subpoena, in which a party or witness is required to testify; and the
subpoena duces tecum, which requires
a party or witness to produce
24
documents and records and to testify.
Administratively issued subpoenas are especially troublesome since
the APA gives governmental agencies no right of enforcement.25 Upon
the failure of a party to comply with a subpoena, an agency must apply
to superior court for a show cause order.2" Only upon default or the
defendant party's failure to demonstrate why the subpoena should be
revoked, will the court order compliance or cite for contempt. The
subpoena duces tecum presents the greatest single opportunity for delay,
especially in rate-making and regulatory matters, since it can often be
attacked successfully as being insufficiently specific. 7 Accordingly,
administrators who issue subpoenas should take care that such documents are limited in scope to matters essential for disposition of the case.
Courts tend to guard business records from administrative scrutiny
except in cases of well documented need. Furthermore, since the
personal appearance of witnesses may be necessary to the fair and
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-32(b) (Supp. 1974); DAmE, supra note 6, § 13.02.
22. See generally Russ v. Board of Educ. of Brunswick County, 232 N.C. 128, 59

S.E.2d 632 (1950); Mank v. Board of Fire and Police Com'rs of Granite City, 71 111.
App. 3d 479, 288 N.E.2d 49 (1972).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-27 (Supp. 1974).
24. Id.
25. DAYE,supra note 6, § 14.03.

26. id.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-27 (Supp. 1974).
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orderly conduct of an administrative proceeding, 28 it is incumbent upon
the administrator in charge to draft required subpoenas in a manner that
can be sustained by courts of review.
Aside from the foregoing dangers inherent in issuing administrative
subpoenas, the APA provides for an agency proceeding to determine
whether a given subpoena should be revoked for cause upon the motion
of a party to the action. 29 The statute requires that, upon written
request, a party is entitled to a separate administrative hearing for the
purpose of demonstrating immateriality or vagueness of an agency
subpoena. 0 As in other cases of agency discretion, decisions not to
revoke subpoenas or grant hearings for challenges are ripe grounds
for allegations of abuse of power.
III. OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR DELAY
Besides the aforementioned major avenues for delay in administrative
hearings, many other possibilities for procedural delay exist, and are
either spelled out in the statute or are matters of common knowledge to
most attorneys. Among these delaying tactics are petitions for intervention;3 objections to the consolidation of cases or common issues;12 and
evidentiary objections. 3 Petitions for any of the three forms of intervention (intervention of right, permissive intervention, or discretionary
intervention) must be timely; however, as in the case of a challenge for
bias directed against a hearing officer, a petition must be recognized as
timely if received at any point before the conclusion of the hearing.34
The denial of a petition for intervention is always subject to judicial
review as an abuse of discretion.
In addition to intervention, the APA provides for the consolidation of
cases or issues where such action might minimize unnecessary costs or
delay.35 While it is evident that a party would have the right to petition
for partition of his case, the statute does not speak to the issue of
whether parties have a right to separate hearings. In any event, delay is
a distinct and necessary product of an objection to consolidation of two
or more contested case hearings.
Finally, evidentiary objections present a fertile field upon which the
seeds of delay in administrative proceedings can be sown. This is true
28. Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. N.C. 1958).
29. DAYE, supra note 6, § 14.02.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-27 (Supp. 1974).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-23(d) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 24

(1967).
32. N.C. GEN.

33. N.C.
34. N.C.
35. N.C.

STAT.

GEN. STAT.

§ 150A-26 (Supp. 1974).

§ 150A-29 (Supp. 1974).
150A-23(d) (Supp. 1974);
150A-26 (Supp. 1974).

GEN. STAT. §
GEN. STAT. §

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol7/iss2/9
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primarily because the APA provides that a party's right to object to
evidence upon judicial review is automatically preserved whether or not
an objection was made at the administrative hearing."
Although generally courts of review will not overturn evidentiary findings of administrative agencies, such findings are subject to scrutiny when shown to be
clearly erroneous, incompetent,3 7 insubstantial, 8 or found to be outside
the proper purview of official notice. 9 Therefore, officers in charge of
administrative hearings must insure that a substantial amount of competent and relevant evidence be admitted in order to substantiate charges
against a party, and that the resultant agency opinion reflects reliance
upon such evidence. In order to minimize delay brought about by
evidentiary matters, it may be advisable for hearing officers to receive all
evidence conditionally, then avoid the consideration of any excludable
facts when reaching a decision. 0 If this procedure is not followed, a
reviewing court might remand the decision for a rescheduled hearing for
the exclusive purpose of admitting improperly excluded evidence. 4 '
Each of the aforementioned possibilities for procedural delay contain
elements of discretion; accordingly, each is subject to judicial review. It
is incumbent upon the administrator in charge of the contested case
hearing to tread his way carefully through the pitfalls contained therein
in order to minimize delay and the possibility of reversible error.
IV.

INJUNCTIVE

REMEDIES FOR PROCEDURAL DELAY

Few remedies are available to administrative agencies to control
deliberate delay of parties to contested case hearings. The injunction is
the most frequently employed. However, in the past the legislature has
strictly controlled the power to use injunctions in administrative matters,
and only where specific statutes
authorize their use have injunctions
42
been sought with any regularity.
Under the Federal Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551
ff.), an agency generally cannot apply to the courts for an injunction
until the administrative proceedings have been concluded. Furthermore, there must be a showing by the agency that unless the defendant
36. N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 150A-29 (Supp. 1974).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51(5) (Supp. 1974); but see Campbell v. North
Carolina St. Bd. of A. B. C., 263 N.C. 224, 139 S.E.2d 197 (1964).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-29 (Supp. 1974); see Appeal of AMP, Inc., 23 N.C.
App. 562, 210 S.E.2d 61 (1974); Worsley v. S. & W. Rendering Co., 239 N.C. 547, 80
S.E.2d 467 (1954); Application of Peterson, 499 P.2d 304 (Alas. 1972); Swindel v.
Kelly, 499 P.2d 291 (Alas. 1972).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-30 (Supp. 1974).
40. DAYE, supra note 6, § 18.10.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 106-123 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-165 (1903).
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is enjoined, irreparable injury to the public will result. It is to be
expected that this will be the general tenor of the courts toward injunctive relief granted to administrative agencies under the North Carolina
APA. Thus, the success of the agency seeking such an injunction will
depend heavily upon the fact situation. For example, it would not be
difficult to show potential irreparable injury to the public health, safety,
and welfare if a packing plant is permitted to ship putrid chickens; it
would be quite another thing to demonstrate that a pest exterminator's
use of marginally effective methods could cause irreparable public harm.
While an agency's ability to obtain an injunction to minimize delay is
provisional, at best, a party to a contested case can easily obtain an order
staying an agency decision pending full judicial review.4 3 Indeed, in the
case of licenses and license renewals, a party need not apply to the
courts for a stay order-the APA confers that right upon him automatically. Hence, injunctive remedies available to administrators as a means
of controlling deliberate delays by parties to contested cases seem to be
inadequate at best, and weighted in favor of the defendant party in all
but the extreme minority of cases where the potential for irreparable
harm to the public can be demonstrated.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDINGS

The primary provision for judicial review in the North Carolina APA
is stated as follows:
Any person who is, aggrieved by a final ,agency decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made
available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of such decision under -this Article.... Nothing in this Chapter
shall prevent any person from invoking any judicial remedy availof any administrative
able to him under the law to test the validity
44
action not made reviewable under this Article.
It is a general administrative law principle that courts, in reviewing
contested case proceedings, will not disturb findings of fact but will
concern themselves chiefly with the abuse of administrative discretion.
45
In the past, North Carolina courts have followed these general rules.
However, the scope of judicial review has been greatly expanded by the
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-48 (Supp. 1974). For provisions relating to stays of
license revocation, see N.C. GEN. STAT. 150A-3(a) (Supp. 1974).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (Supp. 1974).

45. For cases dealing :with findings of fact, see, e.g., State ex rel. Employ. Sec.
Comm. v. Jarrell, 231 N.C. 381, 58 S.E.2d 403 (1950); Henry v. A. C. Lawrence

Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760 (1950); In re Berman, 245 N.C. 6.12, 96
S.E.2d 836 (1957). For cases dealing with abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Jarrell v. Snow,
225 N.C. 430, 355 S.E.2d 273 (1945); Pharr v. Garibaldi, 252 N.C. 803, 115 S.E.2d 18
(1960); Mullen v. Town of Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484 (1945).
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APA. The statute grants courts the right to affirm, remand, reverse, or
modify an administrative decision upon a showing that substantial rights
of the petitioners have been prejudiced by agency findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions."6 Areas in which rights may be compromised
specifically include any violation of constitutional provisions, actions
exceeding the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, the use of
unlawful procedure, reliance upon insubstantial or inadmissible evidence, issuance of arbitrary or capricious
findings or conclusions, and
47
the commission of any errors of law.
When such broad standards of judicial review are available to petitioners, it is necessary that agencies scrupulously safeguard rights in
order to avoid jeopardizing cases upon review.4 8 Accordingly, administrators must remain acutely aware of administrative due process, the
proscription of arbitrary and capricious conduct, 49 and the need to
maintain a complete record. This latter provision is extremely important. The APA provides for the hearing de novo of any administrative proceeding in which the record of the hearing is either absent
or inadequate. 0 Adequate training and experience, in addition to sound
judgment, will be required to conduct contested case hearings successfully under the new statute.
VI.

MINIMIZING THE PROBLEM OF DELAY

The primary tool for breaking the chain of delay inherent in resolving
contested cases is to establish minimal qualifications for the individuals
who conduct hearings. At every point in the proceeding-from the
initial notice to parties, to the rendering of an opinion-they make
rulings and decisions that are open to attack in the courts. In order to
minimize the likelihood of judicial reversal-or the need for judicial
review--one must minimize the mistakes made by the hearing officer.
The simplest and most economical way to accomplish this end is to
create the position of Departmental Hearing Officer (some states and
the federal government denote such officers as Administrative Law
Judges). Ideally the Departmental Hearing Officer should be trained in
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (Supp. 1974).
47. Id.

48. N.C.

GEN.

STAT.

§ 150A-49 (Supp. 1974); see Russ v. Bd. of Educ. of

Brunswick County, supra note 22; see generally Blesso v. Bd. of Plumbing and Piping
Examiners, 30 Conn. Supp. 262, 310 A.2d 136 (1972); Stephens and Stephens Prop.,

Inc. v. State Tax Comm., 499 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1973).
49. Pharr v. Garibaldi, 252 N.C. 803, 115 S.E.2d 18 (1960).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-50 (Supp. 1974); but see City of Phoenix v. Superior
Court in and for Maricopa County, 110 Ariz. 155, 515 P.2d 1175 (1973); Indiana A. B.
C. v. Johnson, 303 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1973).
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law and administration, and should be familiar with the specific governmental agency to which he is attached. With the assistance of a small
supporting staff, the Hearing Officer would be responsible for conducting all rule-making and contested case hearings and all lesser included
duties such as preparation of notices, preparation and maintenance of
the record, preparation of subpoenas, et cetera. As provided in the
APA, the Hearing Officer would, after conducting a proceeding, compose and submit to the board, commissioner, or division head having
original jurisdiction over the matter, a "proposal for decision."'" The
proposal would contain findings of fact and conclusions of law and
would not be binding upon the agency or official having original
jurisdiction. Such officials would be required to decide whether to
accept the proposal as their decision or to render a contrary decision." 2
The action of this administrator, or group of administrators, would
represent the official resolution of the case.
Such a scheme for handling administrative hearings would defeat
many of the problems of delay inherent under the APA. A professional
Hearing Officer's time schedule would be more flexible than that of a
division head, commissioner, or a multi-member board. Therefore,
hearings could be scheduled in a flexible fashion to the advantage of the
agency and the public. This would greatly mitigate the problem of
prehearing delays and continuances.
Furthermore, since a single departmental Hearing Officer does not
present the logistics problem of a multi-member board, or the problem
of tying up key administrators in travel time, he could hold hearings
freely in a defendant party's county, thereby negating challenges for
venue. All appeals for claims of "promoting the ends of justice"--and
the convenience of witnesses--could be turned aside in the hearing or
effectively rebutted upon review.
Since a Hearing Officer would be independent of the regulatory
functions of the department, challenges for bias could be minimized
(i.e., denied without appeals charging abuse of discretion succeeding
upon review). A supplemental benefit would flow to the agency from
this proposition: division heads and members of agencies regulating
defendant parties would be enabled to take part in prosecuting the case
or testifying at the hearing without jeopardizing the fairness of the
proceedings. This would allow more agency control over the case as a
whole, while guaranteeing a fair and just hearing to all parties.
51. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 150A-34 (Supp. 1974); see also, Schwere v. Sanders, 498

S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1973).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-34 (Supp. 1974); N.C.
1974); DAYE, supra note 6, § 19.01.
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Additionally, the Hearing Officer, by virtue of his legal training,
would bring skill and speed to the resolution of delay on subpoenas.
This would guarantee the legality and sufficiency of subpoenas, and the
judicial proceedings necessary to enforce them. The Hearing Officer
would also efficiently administrate hearings for the revocation of
subpoenas for cause.
The expertise and availability of the Hearing Officer would further
allow for the efficient and proper disposition of the handling of evidentiary matters, consolidation or partition of cases, applications for intervention, et cetera. As mentioned earlier, his training would suit him
ideally for the task of writing proposals for decision, including findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
The appointment of a full-time Departmental Hearing Officer would
shift burdens of cost and time from the agency back to the defendant
party. It would then be to the party's advantage to push for a speedy
resolution of the problem so that he might continue his business or other
endeavors within the rules and regulations of the agency. Such a
shifting of the burden would reduce the hours top level administrators
spend mired in procedural delay. It would further allow a reduction in
agency expenditures and permit key administrators to take an active
hand in the prosecution and resolution of the case. The further advantages of closer control of agency function, policy, publicity, and other
matters would flow almost automatically from such a scheme.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Procedural delay of administrative contested case hearings is both
possible and imminently probable, under the new North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. To minimize delay without jeopardizing
agency actions or the regulatory scheme upon judicial review, the appointment of Departmental Hearing Officers seems the best course both
from a logistics and economics standpoint. The results of such action
would be fewer delays, tighter control of cases, a reduction of manhours spent in adjudicatory and rule-making hearings by key administrators, and financial economy within the department.
ROBERT J. HENSLEY, JR.
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